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MICHIGAN'S TEACHER CERTIFICATION
REQUIREMENT AS APPLIED TO
RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED HOME SCHOOLS
Donald D. Dorman*
Increasing numbers of parents teach their children at
home.1 Many "home schoolers" are fundamentalist Christians
or Roman Catholics,2 often concerned that public schools
teach "secular humanism," which they perceive to be anti-
religious.3 Most states have adapted their educational laws
to permit home schools.4 But home-schooling parents in a few
states continue to face burdensome certification requirements,
such as having to acquire the same credentials as public
school teachers. That handful of states includes Michigan.
Michigan laws, which impose fines and imprisonment for
teaching one's own children without a certificate,5 are the
subject of this Note.
This Note defends the thesis that the teacher-certification
requirement of Michigan's compulsory attendance statute is
unconstitutional as applied to people who, for sincere religious
reasons, believe they must teach their children at home.
Michigan courts have incorrectly applied a rational-basis test
in regulating religiously motivated home schools, rather than
the strict scrutiny required by the U.S. Supreme Court for
cases involving both the free exercise of religion and parents'
interest in directing their children's education.6
* Article Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 24, 1990.
B.A., University of Mississippi, 1974; A.M., Indiana University, 1975; J.D.,
University of Michigan Law School, expected 1991.
1. Estimates range from over 10,000 to 1,000,000 families. See Lines, Private
Education Alternatives and State Regulation, 12 J.L. & EDUC. 189, 191-92 (1983);
Smith & Klicka, Review of Ohio Law Regarding Home School, 14 OHio N.U.L. REV.
301, 302 (1987); see also Celis, Growing Number of Parents Are Opting to Teach at
Home, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
2. Lines, supra note 1, at 193.
3. Comment, Parental Liberties Versus the State's Interest in Education: The Case
for Allowing Home Education, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1261, 1268 (1987) (authored by
Michael Knight) [hereinafter Comment, Parental Liberties].
4. See infra Part III.A.
5. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1599 (1979).
6. For a general discussion of free-exercise cases, see infra Parts II.B. & II.C. In
April 1990, a sharply divided Supreme Court limited its application of the strict-
scrutiny test to cases in which government regulations of the free exercise of religion
also invoked "other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the
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Part I of this Note briefly traces the history of education in
America, looking at the precursors of today's home schools and
compulsory attendance laws. It then examines arguments for
and against home schooling. Part II discusses how the U.S.
Supreme Court has dealt with challenges to compulsory
attendance statutes and with free-exercise challenges in
general. Part III summarizes the different approaches that
states currently take to home schooling. Part IV examines
Michigan's statute and how it has been handled in the courts.
Part IV also explains how the first amendment tests mandated
by the U.S. Supreme Court should apply to Michigan's statute.




Home schooling is not a new idea. Seven American presi-
dents were home schooled: George Washington, John and
John Quincy Adams, James Madison, Abraham Lincoln,
Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Other home-
schooled leaders include Patrick Henry, Mark Twain, Thomas
Edison, Andrew Carnegie, Douglas MacArthur, and Pearl
Buck.7
Historically, parents had an obligation to educate their
children long before compulsory attendance laws existed."
For example, the English Poor Laws of the 16th and 17th
centuries were designed to teach poor children a trade to help
make them productive citizens, and the the Massachusetts
Bay Colony's compulsory education law of 1642 also required
parents and masters to provide fundamental education to their
press .. or the right of parents ... to direct the education of their children . ... "
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601, 1605-06
(1990) (holding that a Native American unable to obtain unemployment compensation
after being fired from his job as a drug counselor for using peyote could not be
exempted from a general antidrug law on the ground that his use of peyote was a
religious ritual protected by the free-exercise clause of the first amendment). Home
schooling would remain subject to strict scrutiny because it involves parental
interests in the education of their children.
7. Smith & Klicka, supra note 1, at 301-02.
8. See Comment, Parental Liberties, supra note 3, at 1263-64.
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charges.9 During the 1600s, American parents had the right
and obligation to direct their children's intellectual and moral
upbringing. This responsibility belonged solely to the parents. °
The Massachusetts Bay Colony's compulsory education law
of 1642 preceded the nation's first compulsory school atten-
dance law by more than 200 years." State-supported schools
began as state assistance to parents in their duty to educate
their children. Ironically, those laws have now eroded the
common law parental right to educate one's own children. 2
Thus, ideas about a parent's role in education have changed
markedly since the founding of the United States. In estab-
lishing free public schools, the states assumed the major role
in primary and secondary education. The states do far more
in education now than merely provide financial assistance to
some parents. Parents today may face an uphill struggle if
they want to forego public and private schools. The struggle
is especially difficult in states such as Michigan, where regula-
tion presents formidable obstacles.
B. Reasons for Home Schooling
For uncredentialed parents in states such as Michigan,
home schooling poses considerable risks-imprisonment,
fines, 3 and harassment. These obstacles add to the time
commitment and financial sacrifices of teaching one's children
9. See Comment, Texas Homeschooling: An Unresolved Conflict Between Parents
and Educators, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 469, 470 (1987) (authored by Gerald B. Lotzer).
The 1642 law was aimed at a large number of indentured servants and apprentices,
as English laborers sold themselves and their children into service to pay for passage
to America. Note, Home Education v. Compulsory Attendance Laws: Whose Kids Are
They Anyway?, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 274,276 (1985) (authored by David Allen Peterson)
(citing L. KOTIN & W. AIKMAN, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPULSORY SCHOOL
ATTENDANCE (1980)).
10. See Comment, Home Education in America: Parental Rights Reasserted, 49
UMKC L. REV. 191, 191 (1981) (authored by E. Alice Law Beshoner) [hereinafter
Comment, Home Education in America].
11. The first compulsory attendance law was enacted in 1852. See Comment,
Missouri Home Education: Free at Last?, 6 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 355, 355 (1987)
(authored by James M. Henderson) [hereinafter Comment, Missouri Home Education]
(citing L. KOTIN & W. AIKMAN, supra note 9, at 25. All states had compulsory
attendance laws by the early 1900s. See Comment, Parental Liberties, supra note 3,
at 1264.
12. See Comment, Home Education in America, supra note 10, at 192.
13. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1599 (1979).
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instead of sending them away to school. Given the persistence
of parents who overcome such obstacles and continue to teach
their children at home, one would expect home-schooling
parents to be highly motivated.
People teach their children at home for a variety of reasons.
Some parents are unhappy with the quality of public educa-
tion. 14 A national commission has reported numerous indica-
tions that "the educational foundations of our society are
presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that
threatens our very future as a Nation and a people." 5 A
study of several thousand home-schooled children showed that
they averaged in the seventy-fifth to ninety-fifth percentiles on
the Stanford and Iowa Achievement Tests, and that children
whose parents were prosecuted for violating compulsory
attendance laws averaged in the eightieth percentile. 6
Home-school advocates attribute the success of home schools
to the one-on-one instruction that parents give, and to the fact
that parents can tailor instruction to each child's needs and
abilities. These writers claim that home schools encourage
more individual responses and reduce negative socialization
pressure. These factors, they say, have fueled the rapid
growth of home schools.
17
In addition, a study of home schooling identified several
motivations for home schooling, including the unsuitability of
institutional education, a desire to be free of government
control, concern for the child's social development, concern
about content of education, and personal interest in the
child. 
18
14. See Lines, supra note 1, at 190. Dissatisfaction with the public schools is not
confined to home schoolers. The president of a Michigan manufacturers association
has stated that most members of the association find that "high school graduates
applying for jobs just don't have the educational skills to do them." Vlasic, Education
Reform is Crucial, Detroit News, Sept. 27, 1989, at 1C, col. 2. The education
establishment itself has criticized the public school system. Lawrence Patrick,
president of the Detroit Board of Education, in a recent speech before the Cato
Institute, called for reform. See Patrick, Freedom Begins with Choice of Schools,
Detroit News, Nov. 12, 1989, at 19A, col. 1 (excerpts from speech).
15. NATIONAL COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE
IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM, reprinted in 129 CONG. REC. 11,189, 11,189
(May 5, 1983); see also Smith & Klicka, supra note 1, at 302.
16. Smith & Klicka, supra note 1, at 302-03. Other studies support the position that
home-schooled children do at least as well on standardized tests as students in the
public schools. See id.
17. Id. at 304. The vice-president and the executive director of the Home School
Legal Defense Association, J. Michael Smith and Christopher J. Klicka, respectively,
take this position.
18. D. Williams, Understanding Home Education: Case Studies of Home Schools
[VOL. 23:4736
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C. Objections to Home Schooling
Objections to home schools generally fit into four groups:"s
First, those concerned about social retardation focus on the
inability of the home to provide challenges available in
institutional schools. Second, there is concern over a loss of
public school money because many school districts' funding
depends on enrollment figures. Third, the possibility of
instructional inadequacy is a factor.2 ° Fourth, critics assert
that the interests of parent and child may conflict.21 One
writer suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court ought to find a
federal constitutional right to an education.22 Such a right
could then be pitted against the parents' right to free exercise
of their religious beliefs.
Professor Ira C. Lupu of the Boston University School of
Law sees a virtual Pandora's box of horrors emanating from
the home school: "Parents should have substantial power to
choose their children's teachers, but there is reason to be
troubled when parents choose only themselves."23 Lupu
notes that home schools are "highly likely to be racially
exclusionary. "24 He believes that power and influence over
children should be divided between parents, on the one hand,
and school employees and the community, on the other."
Lupu's concerns, however, pose no constitutional problem
to the religiously motivated home schooler. The U.S. Constitu-
tion does not guarantee freedom from parental influence, just
as it does not guarantee a public education. The Michigan
legislature did not mention promoting freedom from parental
influence as a purpose of the compulsory attendance law.
Until concerns such as freedom from parental influence are
(April 1984) (paper presented to the American Educational Research Associations
available through the E.R.I.C. microfiche system as Document No. ED 244 392); see
also Comment, Missouri Home Education, supra note 11, at 356-58.
19. See Comment, Missouri Home Education, supra note 11, at 358-60.
20. See Celis, supra note 1 (quoting Gene Wilhoit, executive director of the National
Association of School Boards).
21. See, e.g., Note, The Interest of the Child in the Home Education Question:
Wisconsin v. Yoder Re-examined, 18 IND. L. REV. 711, 721-22 (1985) (authored by
Debra D. McVicker).
22. See id.
23. Lupu, Home Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separation of Powers: A
Comment on Care and Protection of Charles, 72 MASS. L. REV., Sept. 1987, at 55.
24. Id.
25. See id.
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enshrined as compelling state interests or as constitutional
rights,26 they should not trump parents' interests in their
children's education or the constitutional right to free exercise
of religion.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
This part of the Note examines cases in which the Supreme
Court has dealt with challenges, based on either parental
interests or the free-exercise clause, to state regulation of
education. The U.S. Constitution contains no language that
expressly deals with education or parental interests. The first
amendment, however, expressly prohibits Congress from
abridging the free exercise of religion. 7 The Supreme Court
has ruled that the fourteenth amendment similarly restricts
the states.2" The constitutional question in home-schooling
cases asks to what extent a state may interfere with the free
exercise of religion, when the religious belief includes main-
taining a home school.29 Stated another way, how far may a
state go in regulating home schools that are maintained for
sincerely held religious reasons? One answer comes from the
landmark case, Wisconsin v. Yoder,3° which held that state
interests in a child's education must sometimes yield to
parents' free-exercise rights.31
A. The Education Cases
The Supreme Court articulated general limits on a state's
power over education in three cases decided in the 1920s.1
2
26. At least one prominent scholar and former jurist would not be suprised if some
judges "find" such a constitutional right, if doing so would meet their own political
agendas. See generally R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
27. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . . " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
28. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
29. The free-exercise clause has two elements: the freedom to believe (absolute)
and the freedom to act (subject to regulation for the protection of society). Id. at 303-
04.
30. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
31. Id. at 215.
32. See Farrington v. Tokushige 273, U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
[VOL. 23:4738
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In the first of these, Meyer v. Nebraska,33 the Court held that
the fourteenth amendment protected the parents' right to
engage a teacher to teach their son to read German.34  The
Court rejected Nebraska's argument that it could regulate
education under its "police power" to protect its citizens, to
provide for their welfare and progress, and to ensure the good
of society.35
Although the Meyer Court ruled for the parents, it recog-
nized some powers of the state to regulate education: "The
power of the State to compel attendance at some school and to
make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a
requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not
questioned."36 But the Court held that the Nebraska statute
prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages such as German
was arbitrary and without reasonable relation to a legitimate
state end. It noted: "No emergency has arisen which renders
knowledge by a child of some language other than English so
clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent
infringement of rights long freely enjoyed."37
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 38 the Court
invalidated an Oregon statute requiring parents to send
children from ages eight to sixteen to attend a public
school.39 The statute made exceptions for private instruction
by a parent or private teacher in "such subjects as are usually
taught in the first eight years in the public school."4 ° As the
Court saw it, the statute could ultimately destroy all private
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
33. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
34. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
35. Id. at 395. The state argued:
If it is within the police power of the State to regulate wages, to legislate
respecting housing conditions in crowded cities, to prohibit dark rooms in
tenement houses, to compel landlords to place windows in their tenements
which will enable their tenants to enjoy the sunshine, it is within the police
power of the State to compel every resident of Nebraska so to educate his
children that the sunshine of American ideals will permeate the life of the
future citizens of this Republic.
Id. at 394.
36. Id. at 402 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 403.
38. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
39. Id. at 530, 534.
40. Id. at 531 n.* (quoting Cumpulsory Education Act, 1923 Or. Laws 9).
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primary schools in Oregon, including appellees'. a In support
of its decision, the Court noted the importance of parents'
interests in their child's education: "The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recog-
nize and prepare him for additional obligations."42
Thus, Pierce provided parents not only with the right to
prepare their children for the future, but also with the duty to
do so. The state's role should be limited to ensuring that
parents meet this duty. If parents satisfy their duty to
prepare their children for the future, then the state should
defer to the parents' judgment.
The 1927 case of Farrington v. Tokushige43 involved territo-
rial regulation of foreign-language schools (mostly Japanese)
in Hawaii.' Hawaii required teachers to receive a permit
from the territorial Department of Public Instruction, which
would be issued only to teachers who were prodemocracy and
knowledgeable about America.45 In addition, the schools
could be in session only one hour a day, could only teach
children after they first attended public school, and could only
use department-approved books and curricula.46 A foreign-
language school's permit could be withdrawn if the depart-
ment decided the school was not qualified.4 v
The Supreme Court in Tokushige upheld an injunction
prohibiting enforcement of the act, noting that the territory
went "far beyond mere regulation of privately-supported
schools where children obtain instruction deemed valuable by
their parents and which is not obviously in conflict with any
public interest."4' The Court struck down regulations giving
"affirmative directions concerning the intimate and essential
details" of the schools; entrusting the schools' control to public
officers; and denying "owners and patrons reasonable choice
and discretion in respect of teachers, curriculum and text-
41. See id. at 534.
42. Id. at 535.
43. 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
44. Id. at 290-91.
45. Id. at 293.
46. Id. at 294, 296.
47. Id. at 295.
48. Id. at 298.
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books."49 It concluded that enforcement of the act would
probably destroy most, if not all, of the territory's foreign-
language schools, and would "deprive parents of fair opportu-
nity to procure for their children instruction which they think
important and we cannot say is harmful.""° Home-schooling
parents would likely feel similarly deprived by such expansive
state regulation of their schools.
In sum, these three cases clearly establish that states have
an interest, albeit not absolute, in the education of children.
They also point out that parents have a strong interest in
their children's upbringing and that states may not regulate
that interest unreasonably. But these cases present only half
of the constitutional argument for home schooling-the part
involving the state's interest in education and the parents'
interest in the upbringing of their child. Many home schools
also have the support of a free-exercise-of-religion challenge to
state regulation of education.
B. The Free Exercise Cases
The free-exercise clause of the first amendment 51 bars govern-
ment regulation of religious beliefs;52 overt, religiously motivated
acts, however, may be regulated if they pose "some substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order."53 Examples of religiously
motivated conduct not protected by the free-exercise clause
include: sidewalk distribution of literature by a minor,'M refusal
to participate in social security,55 race discrimination," inges-
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
52. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
53. Id. at 403.
54. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165, 170 (1944) (holding that the
state interest in protecting children's welfare includes safeguarding them from abuses
and seeing that they receive opportunities to grow into free and independent, well-
developed citizens).
55. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-60 (1982) (explaining that the social
security program is a compelling government interest that might not survive
widespread religious exemptions).
56. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (holding
that the government interest in eradicating racial bias outweighs the burden imposed
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tion of hallucinogenic drugs for sacramental purposes,57 and
polygamy.5"
Although religiously motivated acts are not completely free
from government restrictions, they do receive considerable
protection, particularly when accompanied by "other constitu-
tional protections, such as freedom of speech ... or the right
")59of parents ... to direct the education of their children....
The Supreme Court has mandated a balancing test where
there is such a conflict between religious conduct and state
regulation. In Sherbert v. Verner,6" the Court stated that for
a state regulation 61 to stand, the regulation either must not
infringe appellant's first amendment free-exercise rights, or
must be justified by a compelling state interest.62 In justify-
on religion by denial of tax exemptions).
57. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595,
1605-06 (1990).
58. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) (finding a Mann Act
violation where a Mormon sect still practicing polygamy brought plural wives across
state lines, and rejecting the defense that religious belief prompted the action);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (rejecting the defense to the
federal crime of bigamy that defendant's religious duty as a Mormon required him
to be a bigamist, on the grounds that polygamy long has been an offense against
society, and that it leads to despotism).
59. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601. The limitation of strict scrutiny to instances where
free exercise is coupled with another high interest surprised Justice Blackmun.
Dissenting in Smith, he wrote:
This Court over the years painstakingly has developed a consistent and
exacting standard to test the constitutionality of a state statute that burdens
the free exercise of religion. Such a statute may stand only if the law in
general, and the State's refusal to allow a religious exemption in particular, are
justified by a compelling interest that cannot be served by less restrictive
means.
Until today, I thought this was a settled and inviolate principle of this
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.
Id. at 1615-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice O'Connor
likewise criticized the majority's position in Smith: "In my view, today's holding
dramatically departs from well-settled First A~iendment jurisprudence . . .and is
incompatible with our Nation's fundamental commitment to individual religious
liberty." Id. at 1606 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
60. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
61. The South Carolina statute barred unemployment benefits for claimants who
failed, without good cause, to accept available suitable work. Id. at 401. Appellant,
a Seventh-day Adventist, was fired for refusing Saturday work, and was unable to
find another job that did not require Saturday work. Id. at 399. The Employment
Security Commission found appellant did not have good cause for not accepting work
and thus was ineligible for benefits. Id. at 401.
62. Id. at 403. The Court found that the commission's ruling forced appellant to
choose between following the precepts of her religion and receiving no benefits on the
one hand, and abandoning those precepts and getting a job on the other. "Governmen-
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ing an incidental burden, the Court said that a rational relation-
ship will not suffice. "[I]n this highly sensitive constitutional
area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests,
give occasion for permissible limitation.' '" Further, it is the
state's burden "to demonstrate that no alternative forms of
regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First
Amendment rights."64
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith,65 the Court upheld a generally applicable criminal
law that incidentally burdened a religious practice because the
law was not aimed at regulating the religious practice.66 But
the Court noted that the application of "a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action" has been struck
down where the exercise of religion accompanied "other
constitutional protections," specifically including "the right of
parents . . . to direct the education of their children."" It
thus remains clear that where the free exercise of religion-
accompanied by another "constitutional protection[]"-is
infringed directly or indirectly, courts must apply strict
scrutiny.
C. Wisconsin v. Yoder
The Supreme Court's most significant ruling relevant to
home schooling came in Wisconsin v. Yoder,68 where the
Court held that the first and fourteenth amendments prevent-
ed Wisconsin from compelling Amish parents to send their
children to high school through the age of sixteen.69 In the
Amish tradition, children go to school only through the eighth
grade."° The parents in Yoder feared that sending their
children to high school would expose the parents to church
tal imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise
of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship." Id.
at 404.
63. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
64. Id. at 407.
65. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
66. Id. at 1602.
67. Id. at 1601.
68. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
69. Id. at 234.
70. Id. at 210.
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censure and risk both their own and their children's salva-
tion.7'
The Court noted that Wisconsin's interest in universal
education is not immune from the balancing pro-
cess-especially when it infringes on fundamental rights, such
as the free exercise of religion and the traditional interest of
parents concerning the religious upbringing of their chil-
dren.72 The Court outlined a two-part analysis to determine
if Wisconsin could compel Amish parents to send their
children to school beyond the eighth grade. The Court asked
(1) if the parents' free exercise of religion was being denied or
(2) if there was "a state interest of sufficient magnitude" to
override the free exercise interest.73 The Court found that
the state action clearly interfered with the parents' first
amendment rights.74  The Court noted that the impact on
Amish religious expression was severe: Wisconsin law
compelled the parents to violate their religious beliefs.75 The
Court also found that Wisconsin's interest was not "of suffi-
cient magnitude" to override the parents' interests.76
Wisconsin made what the Court described as a "sweeping
claim" 77 that its interest in universal compulsory education
through age sixteen outweighed the parents' interest.
Rejecting this claim, the Court said it must "searchingly
examine the interests that the State seeks to promote by its
requirement for compulsory education to age 16, and the
impediment to those objectives that would flow from recogniz-
71. Id. at 209. Testimony showed that the parents believed high school attendance
was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life. Id. The Amish have a history,
dating from the 16th century, of insulating themselves from what they see as a
materialistic society. Expert testimony linked the Amish objection to education
beyond the eighth grade to their religion. Id. at 210. Evidence also showed that the
Amish succeed in preparing their children to be productive members of Amish society.
Id. at 212. The trial court upheld the compulsory attendance statute, and the
Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the state did not adequately show that its interest in education overrode the
parents' free-exercise-of-religion rights. Id. at 213. The U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed. Id. at 227.
72. Id. at 214 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 218-19. The Court pointed out that the interest must be rooted in
religion, not merely in a personal or philosophical choice, to receive first amendment
protection. Id. at 215-16.
75. Id. at 218.
76. Id. at 227.
77. Id. at 221.
[VOL. 23:4744
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ing the claimed Amish exemption." 8
The Court accepted two state interests in compulsory
education: preparing children to participate in the political
system and enabling them to be economically self-sufficient.79
The Court stated that the parents' power was subject to state
regulation if it appeared that parental decisions would
jeopardize the child's well being or have a potential to cause
"significant social burdens."8 ° Finding evidence to the con-
trary, the Court barred Wisconsin from enforcing the statute
against the Amish parents.8 '
The Court mentioned a number of factors favoring the
Amish in Yoder. The Amish parents "convincingly demon-
strated the sincerity" of the religious beliefs they claimed; 2
the Amish beliefs were deeply related to their way of life. The
continued survival of the Amish communities and religious
organization depended on their beliefs and daily conduct.
Although the state had an interest in enforcing the generally
valid statute, the Amish showed the "adequacy of their
alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education
in terms of precisely those overall interests that the State
advances in support of its program of compulsory high school
education." 3 The Court suggested that few other religious
groups could make a similar showing. It also noted the
minimal difference between what the state required (compul-
sory education to age sixteen) and what the Amish parents
already accepted (compulsory education through the eighth
grade).8 4
Thus, Yoder applies to compulsory attendance laws the
formula by which the Court evaluates other free-exercise-of-
religion challenges. It requires parents to show that they base
their conduct on a sincerely held religious belief and that the
state regulation burdens their free exercise of religion. Then
the burden shifts to the state to show that it has a compelling
interest in the regulation that overrides the parents' religious
interest. The state must go beyond "sweeping claims" about
its interest and must show "with more particularity" how its
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 233-34 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
81. Id. at 234.
82. Id. at 235.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 236.
Journal of Law Reform
interest will be affected adversely by exempting the parents
from the regulation.85
III. STATUTORY APPROACHES
TO HOME SCHOOLING NATIONWIDE
In every state and the District of Columbia, statutes require
some form of compulsory school attendance, but a rapidly
increasing number of jurisdictions now provide expressly for
alternative educational experiences like home schools. 6
Since the early 1980s, the tendency not to require teacher
certification in home-schooling situations has grown. This
section will describe and analyze how state statutes deal with
home schooling.
A. Categories of State Regulations
Generally, states require children to be educated by certified
teachers or in an institutional setting, but they also often
provide expressly for home schools. As of this writing, forty-
three states and the District of Columbia allowed students to
fulfill compulsory education requirements outside of formal
public schools. For purposes of this discussion, these jurisdic-
tions will be divided between those that do and do not
specifically provide for home schooling. Twelve states and the
District of Columbia allow what loosely might be termed
"equivalent education, however provided." These jurisdictions
permit a student to remain absent from public schools as long
as the student receives some other equivalent educational
85. Id.
86. Numerous works have surveyed state approaches to home schooling. See, e.g.,
Lines, supra note 1; Smith & Klicka, supra note 1; Stocklin-Enright,
Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: New Hampshire's Home Schooling Quandry,
8 VT. L. REV. 265 (1983); Stocklin-Enright, The Constitutionality of Home Education:
The Role of the Parent, the State and the Child, 18 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 563 (1982);
Comment, Parental Liberties, supra note 3; Comment, The Constitutionality of Home
Education Statutes, 55 UMKC L. REV. 69 (1986) (authored by Kara T. Burgess);
Casenote, 16 CUMB. L. REV. 179 (1986) (authored by Kirk Wood).
87. Twenty-four states forbade home schooling without a teaching certificate in
1983. See Lines, supra note 1, at 227-34 (analyzing statutes published as of January
10, 1983). By late 1990, that number was down to seven. See infra notes 103-109
and accompanying text.
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experience. Such jurisdictions, with no explicit home-schooling
provision, are Alaska,' Connecticut,89 Delaware,9" Idaho,91
Illinois,92  Indiana,93  Maryland,94  Massachusetts,95  New
Jersey, 96 New York,97 North Carolina,9" Oklahoma, 99 and
the District of Columbia. 00
88. ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.010(C)( 11) (Supp. 1990) (exempting child from compulsory
attendance if the child "is equally well-served by an educational experience approved
by the school board as serving the child's educational interests despite an absence
from school, the request for excuse is made in writing by the child's parents or
guardian, and approved by the principal or administrator of the school that the child
attends").
89. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-184 (1983) (exempting child if parents "show that the
child is elsewhere receiving equivalent instruction in the studies taught in the public
schools").
90. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2703 (1974 & Supp. 1988) (exempting parents "if it
can be shown ... that a child is elsewhere receiving regular and thorough instruc-
tion").
91. IDAHO CODE § 33-202 (1963) (exempting child from compulsory attendance ifthe
child is "comparably instructed, as may be determined by the board of trustees of the
school district in which the child resides").
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 26-1 (1989) (exempting child from compulsory
attendance at public schools if the child attends "a private or a parochial school").
Illinois also recognized home school as a private school. People v. Levisen, 404 Ill.
574, 90 N.E. 213 (1950).
93. IND. CODE. § 20-8.1-3-34 (1976) (providing exception from compulsory
attendance if the "child is being provided with instruction equivalent to that given
in the public school").
94. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7-301(a) (1989) (exempting child from compulsory
attendance if he "is otherwise receiving regular, thorough instruction during the
school year in the studies usually taught in the public schools to children of the same
age").
95. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 76, § 1 (1988) (exempting child if"being otherwise instructed
in a manner approved in advance by the superintendent or the school committee").
96. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (West 1989) (requiring child to attend public or
private school or "to receive equivalent instruction elsewhere than at school").
97. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3204 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1990) ("Instruction may be
given only by a competent teacher.... Instruction given to a minor elsewhere than
at a public school shall be at least substantially equivalent to the instruction given
to minors of like age and attainments at the public schools of the city or district
where the minor resides."). One court found that a mother who lacked formal
training was a competent teacher and thus allowed her to teach her children at home.
Her "obvious devotion, love, and effort" showed that her young children were
"receiving an extraordinary educational experience which is substantially equivalent
to that which they would obtain in the public schools." In re Blackwelder, 139 Misc. 2d
776, 781, 528 N.Y.S.2d 759, 763 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1987) (requiring children to "attend school"). The
North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the statute includes home schooling: "We
do not agree that the legislature intended simply by use of the word 'school,' because
of some intrinsic meaning invariably attached to the word, to preclude home
instruction." Delconte v. State, 313 N.C. 384, 392, 329 S.E.2d 636, 642 (1985).
99. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 10-105 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991) (excusing
compulsory attendance if "other means of education are provided").
100. D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-401 (1988) (exempting child from compulsory
attendance if privately given instruction "is deemed equivalent by the Board of
Education to the instruction given in the public school").
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Thirty-one other states not only allow home schooling by
parents who lack teacher certification but also have enacted
statutes specifically recognizing home schooling.'1 Many of
these statutes were enacted in the 1980s. 102
Michigan is in the dwindling group of states that require
every child who is able-bodied, able-minded, and not geograph-
ically isolated to be taught by a certificated teacher or in an
institutional setting.0 3  Six other states remained in this
group as of early 1990: Alabama,0 4 California, °5 Iowa, 106
Kansas,0 7 Kentucky,0 8 and New Hampshire.0 9
101. These state statutes are as follows: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802(B)(1)
(1984 & Supp. 1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-15-501 to -507 (1987 & Supp. 1989);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-33-104, -104.5 (1988); FLA. STAT. § 228.041(34) (1987); GA.
CODE ANN. § 20-2-690 (1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 298-9(5) (Supp. 1989); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17:236-236.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-
A, § 5001-A (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 37-13-91 (Supp. 1989); Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.031 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 20-5-102 (1990); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-1701 to -1707 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. §
392.070 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-2.1 (Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-
34.1-03 (Supp. 1989) (temporary amendment effective July 6, 1989 through June 30,
1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (Anderson 1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§
339.030(3), .035 (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1327(d), -1327.1 (Purdon 1986
& Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-19-1 to -10 (1956 & Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 59-65-40 (Law Co-op Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 13-27-3 (Supp.
1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050 (1990); TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.033(a)(1)
(Vernon 1987) (as interpreted by act of May 28, 1989, ch. 658, § 12, 1989 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 2168); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-102(1)(b)(ii) (1989 & Supp. 1990); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 166b (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1 to -257 (1985 & Supp.
1990); WASH. REV. CODE §§ .010(1)(b), 28A.27.010(4) (1989); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1
(1988 & Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. § 118.15(4) (1987-88); WYO. STAT. § 21-4-102(b)
(1986).
102. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A (Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 15-34.1-03 (Supp. 1989) (temporary amendment effective July 6, 1989 through
June 30, 1993).
103. See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 380.1561(1), 380.1561(3)(a), 388.551, 388.553
(1979); see also infra Parts IV and V.
104. ALA. CODE § 16-28-3, -5 (1987) (requiring children to go to a public, private
or church school or to "be instructed by a competent private tutor" who is required
to hold "a certificate issued by the state superintendent of education").
105. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48224 (West 1978) (exempting children from public and
private school attendance if they are tutored by an individual who "hold[s] a valid
state credential for the grade taught").
106. IOWA CODE ANN. § 299.1 (West Supp. 1990) ("In lieu of [public school] atten-
dance such child may attend upon equivalent instruction by a licensed teacher
elsewhere.").
107. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1111(a) (1985) (requiring attendance at a public or
private school "taught by a competent instructor"). A home school taught by an
untrained parent did not qualify as such a private school. In re Sawyer, 234 Kan.
436, 442, 672 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1983).
108. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.030 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1990) (requiring
attendance at a public, private, parochial, or church school).
109. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:1 (1989) (excusing child from public schools if
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B. Features of the Home Schooling Statutes
Although many states adopted home-schooling statutes in
the 1980s, 110 the statutes show no obvious uniformity.
Approaches to home schooling vary widely, both as to the
degree of a home school's accountability to the state and as to
the way that accountability is administered.
This section will examine a number of approaches states
have taken to protect their interest in securing a quality
education for children taught at home. Michigan has ad-
dressed a number of these approaches, as will be shown in
Parts IV and V. Home-school statutes will be categorized
based on the following features: (1) regulations concerning the
competence of the teacher; (2) regulations concerning the
content of the program; and (3) regulations to measure and
assure the student's academic progress.
1. Regulations concerning the competence of the teacher-One
approach to regulating teacher competency is to require that
the home school's teacher pass key parts of a stipulated
proficiency examination. In Arizona, for example, the teacher
must master reading, grammar, and mathematics.' Arizo-
na does not require proficiency in "how to teach" courses such
as those that might be offered in a teachers' college. 1 2
Some states require little or no additional accountability
if the teacher is certificated." 3  Many states allow the
home-school teacher to qualify to teach in a number of
ways, including being judged qualified to teach;" 4 holding
a high school diploma or a general educational development
(GED) equivalency diploma;" 5 holding a baccalaureate
attending 'an approved private school"). In dictum the New Hampshire Supreme
Court found that it is no answer to a charge under this section that a home school
provided equivalent supervised instruction by a private tutor. In re Davis, 114 N.H.
242, 244, 318 A.2d 151, 152 (1974).
110. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
111. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802(B)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1989).
112. This omission gives weight to the unique assets of a home school, where
relationships are ongoing and intimate, unlike an institutional setting, where the
teacher may have had no opportunity to build a strong, one-on-one relationship with
the child, years before formal teaching begins.
113. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-104(2)(i)(1) (1988); FLA. STAT. §
232.02(4)(a) (1989).
114. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04(A)(2) (Anderson 1985); W. VA.
CODE § 18-8-1 (1988).
115. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(c)(3) (1987) (applying provision to
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degree;".6 being supervised by a certificated teacher;1 7 or
being the parent of a child enrolled in an approved correspon-
dence program."'
The foregoing list demonstrates that states allowing home
schooling are concerned about teacher qualifications. This
variety in the ways a home-school teacher can qualify shows
that these states believe that teacher certification is not the
only way to guarantee teacher competence in a home school.
These states also accord value to the relationship between
parent and child, an important factor not taken into account
by an inflexible requirement that the parent-teacher have a
state teaching certificate.
2. Regulations concerning the content ofthe program--Statutes
regulate the content of home-school programs in a number of
ways. Some statutes require teaching certain key subjects.
Others require that formal schooling take place a minimum
number of days per year and a minimum number of hours per
day. Many statutes have reporting requirements, and some
require periodic outside inspections.
Among curriculum regulations, Arizona's requires teaching
in "at least those subjects as reading, grammar, mathematics,
social studies and science."" 9 Colorado, on the other hand,
requires "communication skills of reading, writing, and speak-
ing, mathematics, history, civics, literature, science, and
regular courses of instruction in the constitution of the United
States." 2 ° Louisiana requires "a sustained curriculum of
quality at least equal to that offered by public schools at the
same grade level."' 2 ' A variation on that regulation is
Missouri's rule that subjects be "consonant with the pupil's
age and ability."'22 Minnesota groups the educational basics
into four categories and requires that at least those subject
areas be taught.'23
parents or guardians only; tutors must hold at least a baccalaureate college degree).
116. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101(7)(5) (West Supp. 1990).
117. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-03 (Supp. 1989) (temporary amendment
effective July 6, 1989 through June 30, 1993).
118. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1(A)(iii) (1985 & Supp. 1989).
119. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802(B)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1989).
120. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-104.5(3)(d) (1988).
121. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:236.1(C)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
122. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.031(2)(2)(b) (1986).
123. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101(6) (West Supp. 1990) (requiring "(1) basic
communication skills including reading and writing, literature, and fine arts; (2)
mathematics and science; (3) social studies including history, geography, and
government; and (4) health and physical education"); see also WASH. REV. CODE §
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Some states give home-schooling parents considerable
freedom in selecting curricula. Mississippi only requires a
"simple description of the type of education the . . . child is
receiving."'24 Other states are quite specific. Pennsylvania,
for example, has a lengthy list of subjects for elementary
students and another for the secondary school level, with both
lists requiring "safety education, including regular and
continuous instruction in the dangers and prevention of
fires."'25
Many states require home schools to mirror public schools
in the number of days per year and hours per day in which
they give instruction.'26 Colorado, for instance, requires "no
less than one hundred seventy-two days of instruction,
averaging four instructional contact hours per day."'27
Georgia requires more time but gives greater flexibility; the
program must provide, over twelve months, instruction that is
"equivalent to 180 school days . . . consisting of at least four
and one-half school hours." 2 ' Again, variety exists as to the
degree of flexibility. One state requires "at least one thousand
hours of instruction, at least six hundred hours of which will
be in" various named core subjects.'29
Reporting and record keeping are typical features of home-
school regulations. These requirements help authorities
monitor home schools, and sometimes must be satisfied before
the home school may obtain permission to open. 3 ° They
also assure that home-schooling parents are organized, by
outlining the different steps involved in putting together an
educational program. "' Furthermore, the reporting can
28A.27.010(4) (1989) (requiring "occupational education, science, mathematics,
language, social studies, history, health, reading, writing, spelling, and the
development of an appreciation of art and music").
124. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91(3)(iii) (Supp. 1989).
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327.1(c)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
126. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (1988) (requiring "time equal to the school
term of the county").
127. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-104.5(3)(c) (1988).
128. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(c)(5) (1987).
129. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.031(2)(2)(b) (1986).
130. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-15-503(1) (1987) (requiring written notice
annually of intent to provide a home school); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-104.5(3)(e)
(1988) (requiring annual notice); FLA. STAT. § 232.02(4)(b)(1) (1989) (requiring one-
time notice).
131. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-15-503(1) (1987) (requiring notice to include the
curriculum to be offered, a proposed schedule of instruction, and the qualifications
of parent-teachers); Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.031(2) (1986) (requiring that the parent
maintain records of subjects taught and activities engaged in, samples of the child's
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serve as a vehicle for assuring that the other requirements of
the program-such as teacher qualification 132 and student
progress 133-are met. With initial reporting provisions,
states are able to cut off home schools unlikely to succeed.
Periodic reporting requirements allow regular monitoring of
home schools. Taken together, these provisions allow states
to ensure that the student will be instructed for an adequate
amount of time, in at least a basic core of subjects, by a
motivated parent who has relevant educational qualifications.
One statute requires home schools to maintain detailed
documentation and to make it available to a designated local
official if that official has a "reasonable belief that . .
appropriate education may not be occurring."' 34  Another
statute allows, as a reporting option, a statement from a
certified teacher that, "in his professional opinion, the child is
being taught in accordance with a sustained curriculum of
quality at least equal to that offered by public schools at the
same grade level."'35 North Dakota provides that if the
home-school teacher is not certificated or has not passed a
teacher exam, she is to be supervised by a certificated teacher
who "shall spend a minimum average each month of one hour
per week in contact with each student" and report directly to
the local superintendent.'
31
Many states have passed legislation concerning home
schools. They have established procedures for beginning home
schools, set curriculum requirements, and set out reporting
duties. States typically have some accountability requirement
that must be met before a home school can begin operation.
If the home school ever falls below required standards,
academic work, and evaluations of the child's progress, as evidence that child is
receiving regular instruction); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (1988) (requiring teacher to
"outline a plan of instruction for the ensuing school year").
132. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-03 (Supp. 1989) (requiring that the
annual statement include "[tihe qualifications of the parent to supervise the home-
based instruction") (temporary amendment effective July 6, 1990 through June 30,
1993).
133. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802(B)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1989) (requiring
a copy of the child's achievement test results each year); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-
1327. 1(e)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1990) (requiring the home-school supervisor to "provide
and maintain on file" an "annual written evaluation of the student's educational
progress as determined by a licensed clinical or school psychologist or a teacher
certified by the Commonwealth or by a nonpublic school teacher or administrator").
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327.1(h) (Purdon Supp. 1990).
135. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.236.1(D)(3) (West Supp. 1990).
136. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-03 (1981 & Supp. 1989); see also WASH. REV.
CODE. § 28A.27.010(4)(a) (Supp. 1990) (requiring that a supervising certificated
teacher spend a minimum of one hour a week with the pupil and evaluate the pupil's
progress).
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approval of the school may be rescinded. The bulk of the
reporting burden clearly is on the home-schooling parent. It
also is evident that states have not created vague or lax
regulations. Instead of forcing all home schools to follow the
same route to state approval-teacher certification-they
have allowed several routes, which may or may not include
certification.
3. Regulations to measure and assure the student's academic
progress-Most states with home-school statutes, in addition
to assuring that proper procedures for operating a school are
carried out, want to monitor the student's academic progress.
Typically, a state will monitor academic progress by requiring
students to take a standardized test from an approved list.13
Home-school students may have to take such a test annual-
ly'38 or less frequently.
139
As mentioned earlier, home-school students generally
perform quite well academically. 40 But the states that
allow home schooling have provisions for those students who
do not perform adequately.' Typically, the parent re-
ceives primary responsibility to take remedial action when
his child performs unsatisfactorily;'42 then the child is
137. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327.1(e)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1990)
(requiring the supervisor of the home-education program to select a test from a list
of at least five established by the department of education); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1(4)
(1988) (requiring a test to be selected by the public school or other person administer-
ing the test).
138. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802(B)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1989); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 6-15-503(2) (1987 & Supp. 1989).
139. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-104.5(3)(f) (1988) (requiring that the child
'shall be evaluated when he reaches the equivalent age for grades three, five, seven,
nine, and eleven"); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(c)(7) (1987) (requiring that the child be
tested "at least every three years beginning at the end of the third grade").
140. See supra note ? and accompanying text.
141. State provisions defining unsatisfactory performance vary considerably.
Even states that rely primarily on standardized test scores differ widely about what
percentile rankings should raise alarm. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-
104.5(5)(a) (1988) (13th percentile); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101(8)(c) (West Supp.
1990) (30th percentile or one grade level below the performance level for children of
the same age); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1(C)(i) (1985 & Supp. 1990) (40th
percentile). Some states look at other factors, such as reports by a certificated
teacher. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 232.02(4)(b)(3)(a) (1989). Some states consider the
child's individual abilities, not just raw scores, in gauging success. See, e.g., VA.
CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1(C)(ii) (1985 & Supp. 1990) (allowing, as an alternative to
testing, an evaluation by which the superintendent determines if "the child is
achieving an adequate level of educational growth and progress"); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 28A.27.310(3) (1989) (allowing an individual assessment to verify that the child is
making "reasonable progress consistent with his or her age or stage of development").
142. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.§ 232.02 (1989) (giving parent one year to provide
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retested. 143  Ultimately, if the home school is not meeting
the child's academic needs, the exemption from compulsory
attendance is usually revoked and the child must go to an
institutional school.114  Home schooling may be tried again
once the child's academic performance has recovered.
145
The majority of state legislatures have given careful thought
to home schooling as an educational alternative, and have
concluded that such schools may proceed without a certificated
teacher. 146 Statutes allowing home schooling regulate both
the content of a student's program and the competence of the
teacher, in order to guarantee that both teacher and student
have achieved a certain level of academic skills. Unlike
Michigan, these states have satisfied their concern about the
quality of a child's education without burdening parents with
the requirement that they obtain a state teaching certificate
before they instruct their children at home.
IV. THE SITUATION IN MICHIGAN
This part of the Note looks at Michigan's current treatment
of home schools, with an emphasis on the requirement of
teacher certification. After examining the constitutional,
statutory, and regulatory provisions applicable to home
schools, it examines how state courts have responded to
constitutional challenges. Michigan courts have deviated from
the standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Properly applied, those standards would overturn Michigan's
teacher-certification requirements as an unconstitutional
interference with the free exercise of religion and parental
rights as manifested in home schools.
remedial instruction).
143. The time allowed for remedial action varies. See, e.g., id. (requiring the pupil
to be reevaluated after one year); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-15-505(a)(4) (1987) (requiring
the student to go to an institutional school unless she retakes the test before the
beginning of the new academic year and scores satisfactorily).
144. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-15-505(a)(4) (1987).
145. See, e.g., id. § 6-15-505(e). The state may impose a statutory minimum for
how quickly home schooling may resume. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-
1327.1(m) (Purdon Supp. 1990) (twelve months).
146. See supra Part III.A.
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A. Constitutional, Statutory, and Regulatory Provisions
Michigan's constitution emphasizes the value of both
education and religion. In protecting the free exercise of
religion, Michigan's constitution states: "Every person shall
be at liberty to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience. "147 Regarding education, the constitution
boldly declares: "Religion, morality and knowledge being
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall forever be encour-
aged."4 ' It goes on to vest "[1]eadership and general super-
vision over all public education. . . in a state board of educa-
tion."'49 It provides that members of the state board be
elected, and that the board appoint the superintendent of
public instruction and set his term of office. 5 '
Michigan's legislature, in three-important statutes, stipulated
and added to the powers granted by the constitution to the
superintendent and to the state board of education. First, the
legislature granted the state board of education power to
determine requirements for teaching certificates in the public
schools.' 5 ' Second, the legislature gave the superintendent
of public instruction "supervision of all the private, denomina-
tional and parochial schools of this state" in certain prescribed
matters. 52 It required also that no one teach in the "regular
or elementary grade studies" in any such school without "a
certificate such as would qualify him or her to teach in like
grades of the public schools of the state."53 Thus, in effect,
the legislature extended the state board of education's
regulatory powers to include private as well as public educa-
tion. Michigan's constitution does not require that extension.
Third, the legislature required every child from ages six to
sixteen to attend the public schools.' One exception to this
rule is attendance at "a state approved nonpublic school,
which teaches subjects comparable to those taught in the
147. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4.
148. Id. at art. VIII, § 1.
149. Id. § 3.
150. Id. It also provides that the superintendent is to head a state department
of education, which is to have "powers and duties provided by law." Id.
151. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 380.1531(1) (1979).
152. Id. § 388.551.
153. Id. § 388.553.
154. Id. § 380.1561(1).
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public schools to children of corresponding age and grade, as
determined by the course of study for the public schools of the
district within which the nonpublic school is located."'55 A
parent who fails to comply with the compulsory attendance
provision is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be imprisoned
for up to ninety days.
56
Michigan makes no express statutory provision for home
schools. Home schools, however, appear to fit within the
statutory definition of private schools. 5 7  Thus, a parent
teaching in the home, according to Michigan law, must meet
the same qualifications required of members of the teaching
profession. Those qualifications are specified in the regulatory
pronouncements of the state board of education.
5 1
Teacher-certification regulations, promulgated by the
Michigan board of education, are tailored for people trained for
a career of teaching in an institutional setting. These require-
ments may be desirable for one who aspires to teach profes-
sionally, but they place a heavy-perhaps prohibitively
heavy-burden on parents who wish to teach their own
children at home.
Michigan's Teacher Certification Code 9 requires that
anyone employed in an elementary or secondary school "with
instructional responsibilities" must hold some type of certifica-
tion. 6 °  Candidates for a provisional certificate-typically
the first certificate held' 6 '-must present evidence of at least
155. Id. § 380.1561(3)(a). The other exceptions include: a page at the legislature;
a child under nine years who does not live within two and a half miles of a public
school, unless busing is provided; a child between the ages of 12 and 14 while
attending confirmation classes for not more than five months in either of those years;
and a child who is enrolled in the public schools but attends up to two hours a week
of religious instruction classes during public school hours. Id. § 380.1561(3)(b)-(e).
156. Id. § 380.1599 (1979)..
157. See id. § 388.552 (1979):
A private, denominational or parochial school within the meaning of this act
shall be any school other than a public school giving instruction to children
below the age of 16 years, in the first 8 grades as provided for the public schools
of the state, such school not being under the exclusive supervision and control
of the officials having charge of the public schools of the state.
158. See infra notes 159-170 and accompanying text. The legislature has
mandated a competency floor for persons to whom the state board may issue a
certificate. Beginning September 1, 1991, a passing score on examinations covering
basic skills and appropriate subject areas will be required. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 380.1531(2) (West 1988).
159. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 390.1101-.1305 (1979 & Supp. 1989).
160. Id. r. 390.1105(1) (1979).
161. Id. r. 390.1115(2). Other certificates include: a permanent certificate, a life
certificate, an occupational education certificate, a continuing certificate, a
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forty semester hours "in a program of general or liberal educa-
tion."162 The credits must be completed through an approved
teacher-education institution or accepted in transfer by such
an institution.6 ' The candidate must have a bachelor's
degree and a recommendation from a Michigan college or
university approved for teacher education by the state
board.'64
The candidate also must obtain "satisfactory college credit
in directed teaching."'65 Each semester hour of credit in
directed teaching requires "a minimum of 30 clock hours of
responsible classroom teaching and observation under the
supervision of a sponsoring institution."'66 The complete
directed-teaching requirement is six semester hours.'67
Thus, the successful candidate must have taught, under
supervision in a sponsoring institution, for at least 180 hours.
The regulations do provide that any educational requirement
for certification may be satisfied by "evidence of an equivalent
as determined by the state board."6 ' But because the certif-
icates are geared for public-school teaching positions, the
board probably would not adapt its regulations to certify many
home-schooling parents who had not attended a very close
equivalent to a teachers' college.
Applicants must also request certification within five years
of completing the requirements for certification. 169 A contin-
uing certificate may be issued to an applicant who, while
holding a provisional certificate, has taught successfully for an
employer for three years. 70 Parents who may later decide
to teach their children at home are unlikely to seek certifica-
tion within the specified time period, especially so soon after
professional education certificate and a temporary or full vocational authorization.
Id. r. 390.1101 (Supp. 1989).
162. Id. r. 390.1122(1) (1979).
163. Id. r. 390.1115(2).
164. Id. r. 390.1125 (Supp. 1989). A degree from a regionally accredited
institution may also be accepted "if it is determined that the degree, is equivalent" to
that of the Michigan institution sponsoring the candidate. Id.
165. Id. r. 390.1124(1). The directed-teaching requirement may be waived if the
candidate has a master's degree and already has been employed successfully for three
years as a teacher (or five years if he lacks a master's degree) and has a recommenda-
tion from the school superintendent and the sponsoring institution. Id. r.
390.1124(3).
166. Id. r. 390.1124(2) (Supp. 1989).
167. Id. r. 390.1124(3).
168. Id. r. 390.1152 (1979).
169. Id. r. 390.1121.
170. Id. r. 390.1132(1)(a) (Supp. 1989).
Journal of Law Reform
finishing their own education.
Thus, parents wishing to teach at home in Michigan face
overwhelming hurdles in earning a teaching certificate. A
bachelor's degree from an approved teacher-education college,
with at least 180 hours of supervised student teaching, is the
primary hurdle. Tuition, materials, and transportation costs
loom large. In addition, earning a teaching certificate requires
a very substantial time commitment. This would be time
away from the very children the parent wishes to educate at
home. While a parent is earning a teaching certificate, her
children presumably would have to be taught by someone else.
Finally, the state's teacher-education system may not even
have the resources to provide the training required of home-
schooling parents.
Michigan's regulatory structure imposes a heavy burden on
a parent who wishes to teach his children at home but has not
been educated to be a teacher. For would-be home schoolers
whose sincere religious convictions compel that the children be
taught at home by the parents, this regulatory burden could
lead to a difficult choice: either disobey the law and teach the
children at home, or violate one's religious principles by not
teaching the children at home. Hiring a tutor who has a
teaching certificate would not satisfy a religious duty that
requires the parents to do the teaching.
B. Michigan Court Interpretations of the Constitutionality
of the Teacher Certification Code
States are free to impose regulatory burdens where appro-
priate.' The question at issue here is whether it is appro-
priate for Michigan to require religiously motivated home-
schooling parents to earn a degree from a teachers' college and
spend 180 hours teaching other people's children before being
allowed to teach their own children at home. The following
cases shed some light on how courts have dealt with
Michigan's teacher-certification requirement.
171. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595,
1600 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment)) ("[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with 'a valid and neutral law of general applicability .... 1 1).
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1. Hanson v. Cushman: Home school with no free-exercise
challenge-In Hanson v. Cushman,172 the home-schooling
parents urged that they had a fundamental right to control
their children's education. 7 ' They did not raise a free-
exercise challenge.'74 The federal district court found that
the U.S. Supreme Court precedents did not establish a right
to control a child's education. 175  Without a fundamental
right at issue, the state's burden was only to show that it
acted reasonably in requiring compulsory attendance and
teacher certification. The court did not apply a strict-
scrutiny standard.
Relying on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 17 the Hanson court noted
that the state has a strong interest in education, specifically
in preparing young people to participate in the political
process and to support themselves financially. The court
found that the state advanced this interest by ensuring
minimum competency of those entrusted to teach, thus
justifying teacher certification. 178  Furthermore, the court
concluded, the teacher-certification requirement was appropri-
ate in a home-school setting because of "the difficulty that the
state would surely face in examining and supervising, at
considerable expense, a host of facilities and individuals,
widely scattered, who might undertake to instruct their
children at home without certification"; "requiring certification
as a standard for competency" is, by comparison, a "less
difficult and expensive mechanism" of review. 179  Thus,
Hanson stands for the proposition that Michigan's teacher-
certification requirements are at least rationally related to the
state's interests in education. When a free-exercise challenge
is added, however, the regulation must face strict scruti-
ny.180
172. 490 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
173. Id. at 112.
174. Id. at 114.
175. Id. The Supreme Court, however, recently pointed to the importance in free-
exercise cases of additional "constitutional protections" that include "the right of
parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)... to direct
the education of their children . . . ." Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources
v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601 (1990). The Court also cited Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972). Id.
176. Hanson, 490 F. Supp. at 114-15.
177. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
178. Hanson, 490 F. Supp. at 115.
179. Id.
180. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595,
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2. Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of Educa-
tion: Church-run private school-In Sheridan Road Baptist
Church v. Department of Education,8 ' the Michigan Court
of Appeals held that the requirement of teacher certification
in nonpublic schools did not violate plaintiffs' right to the free
exercise of religion. 182  This case involved a church-run
school. The court applied an inquiry based on the 1963 U.S.
Supreme Court decision of Sherbert v. Verner.18 3 The inqui-
ry proceeded through three steps: (1) Is plaintiffs belief
religious? (2) Does the regulation burden the free exercise of
that belief? and (3) Does some compelling state interest justify
the burden on the first amendment right?
8 4
In Sheridan Road Baptist Church, the appeals court found
that plaintiffs' belief was indeed religious'85 and was bur-
dened by the teacher-certification requirement, 86 although
minimally. It then framed the third step of the inquiry as
requiring the court to "searchingly examine" the state's
interest and the detrimental effect that exempting the plaintiff
might cause.' 7 According to this part of the court's opinion,
the regulation should be upheld only if alternative,
nonintrusive means were not available.'
88
The church schools urged that standardized testing for
children would be less intrusive than teacher certification.
The court, however, questioned the validity of such tests. The
court also stated that testing might occur too late to prevent
harm to students' education and might require the state to
intrude just as much as with the existing regulation.'89
Then, curiously, the court recharacterized the issue as
whether the regulations are "reasonable means" to give effect
to a compelling state interest.' 90 It found the regulations to
1601 (1990); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205-233 (1972); see also supra Parts I.B.
& II.C.
181. 132 Mich. App. 1, 348 N.W.2d 263 (1984), affd by an equally divided court,
426 Mich. 462, 396 N.W.2d 373 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987).
182. Id. at 22, 348 N.W.2d at 274.
183. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
184. See Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church, 132 Mich. App. at 10, 348 N.W.2d. at 269
(citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)).
185. Id. at 11, 348 N.W.2d at 269.
186. Id. at 11, 348 N.W.2d at 270.
187. Id. at 13, 348 N.W.2d at 270.
188. See id.
189. Id. at 19, 348 N.W.2d at 273.
190. Id. at 22, 348 N.W.2d at 274.
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be a reasonable exercise of state authority19 ' and held the
teacher-certification requirement constitutional as applied in
the case.'92 This reasonable-basis inquiry conflicts with the
strict scrutiny accorded other religious rights.193
3. People v. DeJonge: Home school with free-exercise chal-
lenge-In People v. DeJonge,94 defendants were convicted of
violating Michigan's compulsory attendance law by teaching
their children at home without certification.' 95 The DeJonges'-
pastor testified that the Grand Valley Orthodox Christian
Reformed Church, of which they are members, teaches that
God gives parents the responsibility for educating their
children, but that parents may delegate that responsibili-
ty.'96 The children's mother, Chris DeJonge, who did the
teaching, agreed with the pastor. '97 However, the father,
Mark DeJonge, testified that he believed it to be "a sin to
submit to state authority and to employ certificated teach-
ers." 19 The court of appeals found the burden on Chris
DeJonge from state regulation to be minimal because "[h]er
religious belief does not prohibit her from hiring certificated
teachers."' 99 It found the burden on Mark DeJonge to be
greater, however, and observed that "there appears to be no
room for compromise. It then pointed out that DeJonge's
freedom to act on his belief is not absolute, and that "h]is
conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
societal interests."
20 1
The court also determined that Michigan's certification
requirement "is the least obtrusive means of achieving the
state's interest."20 2 It stated that "[i]n arguing to the con-
trary, the DeJonges have not proposed an alternative. Their
191. Id.
192. Id. at 27-28, 348 N.W.2d at 277.
193. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
194. 179 Mich. App. 225, 449 N.W.2d 899 (1989) (on rehearing). The Supreme
Court of Michigan, "in lieu of granting leave to appeal," remanded "the case to the
Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Department of Social Services v.
Emmanual Baptist Church, 434 Mich[.] 380 [, 455 N.W.2d 1 (1990)] and decisions of
the United States Supreme Court since the issuance of the Court of Appeals decision
in this case." People v. DeJonge, Nos. 87978, 87979, 1990 Mich. LEXIS 2787 (to be
reported at 461 N.W.2d 365) (Mich. Oct. 17, 1990).
195. DeJonge, 179 Mich. App. at 228, 449 N.W.2d at 900.
196. Id. at 228-29, 449 N.W.2d at 901.
197. Id. at 229, 449 N.W.2d at 901.
198. Id. at 234, 449 N.W.2d at 903.
199. Id. at 235, 449 N.W.2d at 903.
200. Id.
201. Id., 449 N.W.2d at 903-04.
202. Id. at 236, 449 N.W.2d at 904.
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position is based solely on the assertion that most other states
do not require certificated teachers in home schools."2 °3
The court then went on to express its opinion that curricu-
lum and attendance requirements alone are not enough to
meet the state's interest in education. Such requirements, it
said:
ensure that the student and the educational material are
in the same place at the same time. However, they do
nothing to ensure that the material is imparted to the
child in such a way as to be understandable. Alone, they
are unlikely to stimulate intellectual curiosity and inquiry
or to cause that fascinating conjunction of superficially
incompatible facts that is creative thought.2 4
Thus, the Michigan Court of Appeals quickly dismissed the
means by which more than forty states handle home
schools. 2 5
C. Application of Supreme Court Tests
Michigan courts have yet to apply correctly the Supreme
Court's tests to a free-exercise challenge of the teacher-
certification requirement. The proper application of the U.S.
Supreme Court's strict-scrutiny and least-restrictive-means
tests suggests Michigan's teacher-certification requirement, as
applied to parents who want to teach their children at home
for religious reasons, is unconstitutional. In Sheridan Road
Baptist Church, the appeals court slipped into a rational-basis
standard, rather than a strict-scrutiny standard.2"6  An
203. Id. at 236-37, 449 N.W.2d at 904.
204. Id. at 237, 449 N.W.2d at 904.
205. See supra Part III.A.
206. See supra Part III.B.2. In the aftermath of Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1989), it is unclear whether the U.S.
Supreme Court would mandate the balancing test from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963): "We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the
Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation." 110 S. Ct. at 1602.
The State of Michigan, in its brief and oral argument in the Michigan Supreme
Court, acknowledged that the Sherbert standards should apply to a free-exercise
challenge of the teacher-certification law. See Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v.
Department of Educ., 426 Mich. 462, 555, 396 N.W.2d 373, 416 (Riley, J.,
dissenting). But even if the Sherbert version of strict scrutiny (least restrictive
means to achieve a compelling state interest) were not applicable, the Smith Court
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evenly divided Michigan Supreme Court upheld the deci-
sion,20 7 but a three-justice dissenting opinion in Sheridan
Road Baptist Church by now Chief Justice Riley pointed out
the faulty analysis. °8
Similarly, the appeals court in DeJonge appeared to place
the burden of proof on the wrong party in dealing with the
question of whether the state has other, less intrusive means
available to it to regulate home schools. °9 In Wisconsin v.
Yoder,21 ° the U.S. Supreme Court placed the burden on the
state to show that its interest overrode that of the par-
ents.21'
As discussed earlier, Wisconsin v. Yoder establishes the
procedure for inquiry in a free-exercise challenge to a state
education statute.2" 2 First, parents must show that their
conduct stems from a sincerely held religious belief. Second,
they must show that the regulation burdens, directly or
indirectly, their exercise of religion. The burden of proof then
shifts to the state, which must show it has a compelling
interest in the regulated activity. Finally, the state must
show "with more particularity" how its interest would be
adversely affected by exempting the home school. Under
Sherbert v. Verner,213 the state must show that there is no
less intrusive means by which it may attain its interest.
In a religiously motivated home-schooling situation, the
parents sincerely believe it is their duty to teach their
children. Home-schooling parents are burdened by Michigan
regulations: many do not hold a teacher's certificate and
certificates cannot be obtained either quickly or cheaply.
Gaining admittance to a teachers' college, paying tuition,
attending classes, and student teaching are all extremely
demanding requirements to be met before a parent may teach
his child at home. The time required to fulfill these require-
ments might be enough of a burden to defeat the very purpose
reaffirmed Yoder. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601 n.1.
207. 426 Mich. 462 (1986).
208. Id. at 555 (Riley, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plurality of supreme court
justices and the appeals court relied on "misapplication of the applicable standard of
review").
209. See People v. DeJonge, 179 Mich. App. 225, 236-37, 449 N.W.2d 899, 904
(1989) ("[T]he DeJonges have not proposed an alternative.").
210. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
211. See supra Part I.C.
212. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
213. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also supra note 60 and accompanying text. The
applicability of this test is now unclear in view of Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). See supra note 206.
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of the parents; often someone else will have to teach his
children while a parent is away from home earning a teaching
certificate. Where the religious requirement is that the
parents themselves do the teaching, it is no solution to hire
someone who is certificated and who shares the parents'
religion. Thus, the parents in this situation have clearly
shown that the state regulation burdens their sincerely held
religious belief, and the burden now shifts to the state.
The state has no problem showing it has a compelling
interest in the education of the children. The need to educate
children so that they may become citizens who are prepared to
participate in the political system and who can support
themselves economically is a compelling state interest.
214
The first three steps of the process outlined in Yoder do not
pose any problems in the Michigan cases, where the parents
have sincere religious motivations for home schooling that
would be impaired directly by the state, but the state itself
also has a compelling interest in education. The issue, under
Yoder, boils down to whether the state can show "with more
particularity" how its interest will be affected adversely by
exempting the home school from the teacher-certification
requirement. Under Sherbert, the question becomes whether
a less intrusive means exists for the state to attain its interest
in the education of children. The burden of persuasion at this
point rests on the state. Michigan must show that its interest
in education is more compelling than that of most other states,
or that most other states erred in their procedures that allow
for home schools. It is significant that home-school statutes
in other states have already been enacted; they are not mere
proposals of home-school advocates.
In finding that teacher certification is the least restrictive
means of furthering the state's interest in education, the
Michigan Court of Appeals attacked standardized tests, used
by a large number of states to monitor home schools, 215 as
an ineffective guarantee of home-school success.1 6 The
court's analysis proceeded as follows: (1) it is unclear that
standardized tests measure validly a student's academic
progress; (2) even if a valid test existed and could be adminis-
tered, there is the danger that a year of the child's education
214. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); see also supra notes 62-63 and
accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
216. See Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v. Department of Educ., 132 Mich. App. 1,
19,348 N.W.2d 263,273, affd by an equally divided court, 426 Mich. 462,396 N.W.2d
273 (1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987).
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could be wasted before any shortcomings were detected; and
(3) the very administration of such tests would intrude on the
home school about as much as the teacher-certification
requirement does.
2 17
Each of these arguments against the use of standardized
tests to monitor home schools is fatally flawed. The first
frontally assaults the concept of standardized tests, yet
Michigan itself relies heavily on such tests. Its colleges and
professional schools use standardized tests in their admission
decisions.21 Tests also are used to license activities ranging
from the practice of medicine to selling insurance and driving
a motor vehicle.219 Standardized tests are given to public
school children in Michigan each year.220 Moreover, many
other states use standardized tests to measure a home-
schooled child's academic progress.22 1 Some states consider
at least five tests to be valid, and allow parents to choose any
of them.222 If a single examination used by Michigan or any
other state passed the validity test, that examination could be
identified as one that could help Michigan meet its interest in
education, and the argument for teacher certification in home
schools would fail.
The appeals court's second argument also fails. In Sheridan
Road Baptist Church v. Department of Education,223 the
court of appeals was troubled by the assumption that any
standardized test would be given after the home school had
existed for a while, perhaps as long as a year.224 If the
school did not educate adequately, the test would not point
217. See id.
218. See, e.g., U. MICH. BULL. Apr. 26, 1989 (Law School Announcement 1990-91),
at 91.
219. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.16177 (1979); Mich. Admin. Code r. 338.2314
(Supp. 1989) (requiring a national licensing exam for physicians practicing in
Michigan); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.1204 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990) (requiring
a written examination for insurance agents licensed in Michigan); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 257.309 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990) (requiring an examination for drivers
licensed in Michigan).
220. A groundbreaking new state reading test, developed during five years of
research by the Michigan Department of Education, working with the Michigan
Reading Association, was approved for 330,000 pupils. The Michigan Educational
Assessment Program test also included a math test. See Russell, Reading Skills Are
Put to Test, Detroit News, Sept. 19, 1989, at 1A, col. 6.
221. See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327.1(e)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1989)
(requiring the home-education program supervisor to select a test from a list of at
least five established by department of education).
223. 132 Mich. App. 1, 348 N.W.2d 263 (1984), affd by an equally divided court,
426 Mich. 462, 396 N.W.2d 373 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987).
224. Id. at 19, 348 N.W.2d at 273.
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that out until after the fact. Thus, a year or so of the child's
life would have been squandered. The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, allows curtailment of the free exercise of religion
only for the "gravest abuses." 225 It is hardly a grave abuse
for a well-meaning parent to keep a child out of public schools
for a year.
In addition, the state has means other than teacher certifi-
cation available to it to ensure that the home school gets off to
a good start. It can require the parent who does the teaching
to have academic credentials that are not as geared toward
teaching professionally in an institutional setting. It can
require supervision by a certificated teacher. Michigan could
require the parent to obtain approval before beginning the
home school, and in the application require that a number of
factors be addressed satisfactorily, such as the specifics of
what will be taught in the home school and a schedule of when
the teaching will occur. Thus, the state could exercise
considerable control over the home school and eliminate the
likelihood of "grave abuses." These regulations could adequate-
ly protect the state's interest until a valid standardized test
could be administered.
The court of appeal's final argument is similarly unsatisfac-
tory. The court in Sheridan Road Baptist Church expressed
concern that other regulations would be as intrusive as
certification.226  The certification requirement, however, is
not merely intrusive; where the parents have no professional
teaching background, the certification requirement effectively
prohibits home schooling. No other requirement could be as
intrusive as one that stops the home school from operating
until the parent spends what could be years obtaining teacher
certification. Standardized testing may be bothersome;
reporting may be time-consuming and onerous; but neither is
as intrusive as the requirement of earning a four-year
teacher's degree before beginning home schooling. An obvious
solution to the court's intrusiveness quandary would be to
allow certification as one option, and various reporting and
standardized-test requirements as another. This would allow
parents to choose the option they consider less intrusive.227
The state might argue that the various alternatives to
certification requirements are too costly for the state to
administer. But in home schools, parents could bear virtually
225. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
226. 132 Mich. App. at 22, 348 N.W.2d at 275.
227. This solution has been pointed out before. See Mangrum, Family Rights and
Cumpulsory School Laws, 21, CREIGHTON L. REV. 1019, 1044 (1987-88).
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all of the marginal costs of teaching the child at home rather
than in the public schools. For example, a fee could be
imposed for the privilege of having a home school. That fee
could cover the costs of paperwork, standardized tests, and
whatever supervision the state might give.
22 8
Thus, it is clear that viable alternatives to certification exist
whereby Michigan could protect its interest in education.
Under Sherbert, where a regulation burdens the free exercise
of religion, the mere existence of less intrusive alternatives is
enough to warrant an exemption. A "searching examination"
of Michigan's interest in education shows that exempting
religiously motivated home schools from the teacher-certifica-
tion requirement would not seriously interfere with the state's
interest. Therefore, under Yoder, Michigan's teacher-certifica-
tion requirement should be ruled unconstitutional as applied




The U.S. Supreme Court mandates strict scrutiny for regula-
tions that burden the free exercise of religion coupled with
parental interests. The state must show that it has a compel-
ling interest to protect. Its regulation then must pass a
searching examination or be the least restrictive way in which
the state can protect its interest. If the state fails to make
these showings, it must exempt the activity from the regula-
tion.
Michigan is one of only seven states that require either
attendance at an institutional school or instruction by a
certificated teacher. Forty-three states and the District of
Columbia allow home schooling by a teacher who has not been
certificated. These jurisdictions have many different ap-
proaches to protect their interest in education, including
228. If such a fee system were structured to burden home schools minimally, it
would not unconstitutionally infringe the parents' free-exercise rights. States are
allowed to meet their compelling interests, even in the face of free-exercise rights, by
a means that passes a searching examination, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
221 (1972), or by the least restrictive means available, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
229. Yoder's use of strict scrutiny survives the recent decision of Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith because the Court explicitly
stated that strict scrutiny still applies when free-exercise rights are paired with
parental interests. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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demonstrating teacher competence in ways tailored to the
home-school setting, complying with various curriculum and
reporting requirements, and having the student tested
periodically. Where the home school fails to meet statutory
standards, the laws generally provide that the child must be
educated in an institutional setting.
Michigan's court of appeals has not correctly applied the
tests required by the U.S. Supreme Court. Proper application
of the tests to home schools established for religious reasons
would require that such home schools be exempted from the
teacher-certification requirement. Such an outcome is assured
because Michigan can protect its interest in education without
requiring that home-schooling parents be certificated as public
school teachers. The arguments on which Michigan has relied
to require teacher certification do not hold up in the bright
light of strict scrutiny under which the Supreme Court
mandates that they be examined.23 °
Michigan prides itself as being a pace-setter in the field of
education. The time is ripe for the state to decriminalize
home schooling by sincere and competent parents who lack
teacher certification and the resources to obtain it.
230. Although Michigan clearly must exempt religiously motivated home schoolers
from its teacher-certification requirement, the question remains of what to do with
those who home school for other than religious reasons. There is no obvious constitu-
tional argument that Michigan must exempt them as well. Thus, dealing with
secularly motivated home schoolers appears to be within the state's legislative
discretion.
It is doubtful, however, that secular home schoolers are more of a threat to the
state's interests than are religious home schoolers. A strong argument could be
made, in fact, that secular home schoolers are highly deserving of exemption, because
their reasons are likely to center around a quest for academic excellence. It is a
questionable public policy that would attempt to frustrate such goals.
A more sensitive and productive approach to home schooling would be for
Michigan to exempt from teacher-certification requirements all home schools that
comply with regulations tailored for parent-teaching-child situations. It simply
makes sense to take into account the unique educational opportunities that a parent
has with his own children. Most states already do.
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